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In the Supreme Court 
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R. D. TOBIN, individually and R. D. TOBIN, as 
attorney in fact for Volney Andersen, Viggo 
Anderson, Fred L. Bach, Connell Blackwood, 
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Harrington, Frank L. Harrington, P. K. 
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Lenz, Leonard Lysne, Frank J. Melchert, 
Olga Melchert, Nels Nielson, Mrs. Nels 
Nielson, C. T. Nolan, Hanna A. Morris (nee 
Hanna A. Oeck) Lawrence Patrick, Charles 
H. Pratt, C. M. Randall, Mrs. C. M. Randall, 
Andero Selgebo, Edwin C. Speck, E. L. 
Stinson, Grant Stoner, Eddie Tetrault, Jens 
Thogerson, J. W. Tobin, Arthur Tretheway, 
Amos A. Tp.rk, Jennie Esp, W m. Adams, Mrs. 
Wm. Adams, Catherine Roudabaugh, Harry 
Harvey, W. J. Harvey, Mrs. W. J. Harvey, 
Dr. 0. A Kenck, Griffith E. Davis, J. R. 
Culver, H. C. Erickson, Mrs. Frank Allllm, 
Magnus Kildahl, Mrs. DeUa E. Bird/ l'eter 
Berube and Tony Tomsheck and Mrs. Tony 
Tomsheck, 
Respondents, 
vs. 
UNITED BOND AND FINANCE CORPORA-
TION, a corporation, W. R. BECKSTEAD, 
as President of said corporation, BOYD 
EVANS as Secretary of said corporation, 
W. R. BECKSTEAD, BOYD EVANS, LES-
LIE D. SPILLSBURY, JOHN DOE AND 
RlCHARD DOE, as directors of said corpor-
ation, W. R. BECKSTEAD, individually, 
and STELLA C. BECKSTEAD, his wife, 
EGBERT P AN D 0 L F 0, BECKSTEAD 
LIVESTOCK, a corporation, an d IN-
VESTORS THRIFT ·COMPANY, a corpora-
tion, 
Ap·pellants, 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
LOBEL AND ADAIR, 
L. DELOS DAINES, 
RAWLINGS, wALLACE & BLACK, 
BRIGHAM E. RoBERTs, 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
IRVINE, SKEEN & THURMAN' 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of U tab 
R. D. TOBIN, ET AL., 
Respondents, 
vs. Case N·o. 6380 
UNITED BoNn & FINANCE CoRPo-
RATION, a corporation, ET AL., 
AppeUants. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
In 'their original brief the appellants presented c.er-
tain matters pertaining to the pleadings, the findings, 
and the decree of the Trial ·Court, and well-e,sta blished 
p·r.inciples of law in relation thereto, which were thought 
to be fundamental. The respondents hav.e made little 
I 
or no effort to meet the a.rgum·ents therein presented, 
but on the ·other hand have chosen to present their case 
in ·a manner having but slight relation to the points as-
signed as error and argued by app·ellants, and for that 
reas·on it becomes neces·sary f.or 'appellants to reply to 
• 1 
certain matters suggested and argued in respondents' 
brief. 
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In the first part of their brief respondents call the at-
tention of the ·Court to certain st·a,tements of fa:ct which 
they insist are ·controverted. 
Directing the Court's .attention to these matters we 
desire to point out ·that appellants have eontended from 
the first, and do now contend, that it appears from the 
pleadings, from the evidence, and from the decree of the 
Court, that the only purpose of this action is to procure 
the appointment of a receiver. Of course this matter is 
controverted. If it is not, re.sponde:p.ts are out of court 
without reme.dy as the authorities cited in our original 
brief ~clearly shovv. 
In answer to the ma'tter pertaining to reserve for 
common stock, we :call the 1Court 's attention to the three 
audits offered in ·evidence as a part of defendants' case, 
namely, the audit made as of the close of busines·s D~e­
c.ember 31, 193:5 by .Beesley and 1Wood, the audit made as 
of the close of business De~c.emher 31, 1938, by IS. D. 
Rasn1ussen and ·Company, and the audit made as of the 
close of business December 31, 1939, by 'Beesley and 
Wood. In each .of these audits the auditors under the 
Liabilities column, and particularly under the Net \Vorth 
Division thereof, have shown this reserve. Beckst·ead 
testified that this reserve was set up and created as a 
result of the sale of units of stock for more than 
$12'5.00. 
It is true that B.eckstead was a poor ·man when he 
set ·out ·to organize the United Bond and Finance ·Corpo-
ration, and as far as that is concerned, he is still a poor 
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1nan, as appears from the evidence produced by re-
spondent over the objeetion of appellants. ~rhey, \vith 
notieeable interest, proved his insolvency and ilnpecuni-
o~ity at the trial, but neYertheless it \Yas thr·ough 
Beckstead ~s efforts and the time and attention he devoted 
to this eorporate enterprise that it \Yas able lo survive 
and achieve the success \Yhieh is sho,vn and indicated by 
the audits and finHncial staten1ents introduced as part 
of the eYidenre. There is no evidence that Beck-
stead ever made $15,000.00 a year as a representa-
tive or employee ·Or officer of the United Bond and 
Finance ·Corporation, and we call the •Court 's attention 
to the testimony of Mr. Beckstead in support of this 
assertion. There ea.n be no question but what B-Hckstead 
has dra,vn a salary from the ·con1pany for his services 
since December of 1931, but no finding was ever 
made by the trial Court, (in fact no evidence 
was offered on the I·ssue by the plaintiff), to 
the effect that the salary drawn by Beckstead has 
been exorbitant or unreasonable. It is asserted that 
Beckstead did nnt invest the corporation's money in ac-
eoroanee with the ·COrporate purposes, and that he did 
not do all things necessary to keep the assets of the 
company invested in interest bearing securities. The 
corporate purposes ·are cle·arly set forth in the articles 
of incorporation, and an examination thereof will show 
that the investment of the assets of the corp·o-
ration in apartment houses, first mortgages, real 
estate contracts, ranches and livestock is specifically set 
forth as being 'vi thin the corporate ,purposes. Aec:ording 
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to Be·ckstead 's testimony, prior to the acquisition ·Of the 
apartment houses the money and assets of the corpora-
tion vvere invested in mortgages and interest bearing 
securities. No attempt was made· to disprove this evi-
dence. It is asserted that the corporation abandoned its 
corporate purposes and changed its business activities. 
We cannot understand what is meant by ''abandoning 
the eorporate purposes'' when the evidence clearly 
sho"\V·S tha·t there has been no abandonment, and the cor-
poration at all times bas engaged in business strictly 
within the authorization of the articles of inc;o·rporation. 
It is true that during the life of the corporation it has 
engaged in various business activities, but all the activ-
ities engaged in were authorized by the ·articles. The 
evidence clearly sho~~s that the depression did affect the 
business and corpor·ate aff.airs ·Of the defendant corpo-
ration, and it is well known that practically every corpo-
ration was similarly effected by this condition. 
With respect to the payment of dividends the un-
questioned ·evidence of the defendant was sufficient to 
show what has happened to the assets of the eorporation 
sinc.e its organization, and the reas.ons why dividends 
have not been paid. This evidence discloses that the 
income of the corporation has been used to reduce in-
debtedness and principal iba1ances due on obligations 
secured by m·ortgage-s on corporate property, and for the 
purpose of acquiring livestock and valuable ranch prop-
erty in Wyoming. The .c·ourt made no finding whatso-
ever that dividends were vvrongfully withheld; or that 
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there ''"as any misn1anagen1ent whatsoever by the failure 
of the corporation to pay dividends. There wa.s no in-
timation in the pleadings nor during the trial, nor in the 
findings of the C'ourt, that dividends paid by the corpo-
ration prior to July, 1931, W·ere in ~any way wrongfully 
paid -or taken from the -capital .of the corporation. We 
also call the ·attention of the Court to the fa!c.t that no 
accounting or audit was ordered to determin·e whether 
or not these dividends represented actual earnings or 
whether they were "sucker bait" ·Or "come-on'' divi-
dends. No stockholder has ever complained because of 
the payment of these dividends, and no a.ttempt was 
made to go into this question during the trial of this case. 
It seems that counsel's "after thoughts,.' will never cease 
until this cas.e is finally and completely determi~ed. 
Appellants submit that the evidence shows that 
the stockholders of the United Bond and Finance 
Corporation did sell and trade their stock to stockholders 
and stockbrokers, and that these stoektraders and brokers 
we;re not agents or employees ·Of the United Bond and 
Finance Corporation. 
The articles of in-corporation of t~he United B.on'd and 
Finance Corp·oration permit the investment .of assets of 
the corporation in its own sto-ck. It is well known that 
this pr·actice was followed by many corporations, not only 
in Utah, but generally, as appears from the testi-
mony of Wood and Beckstead. The preferred stock 
certificates provide for their retirement, and to 
assume th·at these provisions were made with evil intent 
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is to make a presumption that is not justified hy the evi-
den·ce nor by any .p·roof offered by either party to this 
lawsuit. Respondents make no reference whatsoever to 
any part of the record to support th-e assertion that 
Beckstead had in mind any unl(awful or evil intent with 
respect to the repurchase of its own stock by the corpo-
ration at the time it was organized or at any time 
t·hereafter. From 1927 -1~931 the assets of the corpora-
tion, as a.ppe•ars fr.om Beckstead's testimony, were in-
vested in mortgages and .other interest hearing securities, 
and thus an immediate return .on investments was pro-
cured. 
It is asserted that the depression simply furnished 
Beckstead with an ·excuse and with an alibi for dis·con-
tinuing the paying of the so-called dividends. The 
many assumptions which would be necessary to 
support this pr·oposition are rather st·artling. It is well 
known that the depression resulted in the inability of 
people generally to pay interest or to make payments · 
on principal.· It is well known that this general condi-
tion of distress made necess~ary the organization ·Of the 
Home Owners' Loan Corporation and other relief 
agencies to p·rotect home owner.s from £oreclosure, and 
of necessi~ty companies doing the business that the finance 
company was doing were among the first to suffer a loss 
of income. 
It was not Be·ckstead who disheartened ·and discour-
aged the stockhold·ers, ·but the depres•sion itself, and the 
stockholders of the United Bond an·d Finan·ee Corpora-
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tion "·ere no different from stockholders in other cor-
porations doing· busines-s in the United States at that 
time. The Court, \Ye think, should take judicial kno,v-1-
edge of the £act that the value of stocks of ~all kind de-
clined sharply during this .period, and that stocktraders 
and stockbrokers did engage in stock trading schen1es 
throughout the country. 
An intimation is contained in the third paragraph 
appearing -on page ( 5) of the brief that the stocktraders 
and stockbrokers \Yho \Yere engaged in these practices in 
lTtah ~nd ·surrounding states were all agents, representa-
tives and ·employees of the United Bond and Finance 
Corporation. De:fini te evidence ''Tas in troduceq by the 
plaintiffs through the \Yitness Mads~en, to the effect that 
at the time he \vas \vorking with P,andolf.o they vvere 
trading Tri-hase oil certificates for stock of every and 
any kind. l\iadsen stated that during the time he worked"" 
for Pandolfo he could not remember of having purchased 
any units of United B·ond and Finance Corporation stock. 
No attempt \Vas made by plaintiffs to refute the testi-
mony of Beckstead that none· of the stockbrokers from 
whom 90lfo ·of the stock was purchased had ~any connec-
tion whats.oever with United Bond and Finance ,Corpo-
rati·on or Beckstead personally, and evidently the stock 
which is the subject of respondents lament all came into 
the hands of these brokers before it was acquired by the 
eorpora tion. 
In the last paragraph on page ( 5) respondents speak 
of the danger to Beckstead of dealing op~nly and directly 
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with such stock pickers as Egbert Pandolfo, Art Mad-
sen, Paradis and· a long list of others. 
In the first pla.ee, the evidence clearly shows that 
Beckstead did deal openly with Pandolfo and purchased 
either from Pandolfo or from his wife, or from Roe 
l{elley, who represented Pandolfo, some $5,000.00 worth 
of stock. There is no evidence in the record that Beck-
stead· ha'd ~any other connection with Pandolfo whats.o-
ever. Although Pandolfo was named a.s one of the de-
fendants, ~and various charges were made in the com-
.plaint to the effect that P'andolfo ~and Beckstead worked 
hand in hand together, there was not .one word of evi-
dence to estaiblish this proposition, and no finding was 
made by the Court .supporting such allegations. 
·With respect to Madsen, ther·e w•as no evid,ence what-
soever connecting him in any way with ·either Be0kstead 
or the United B·ond and Finance Corporation, and as 
far as Paradis is concerned, his conne·ction ceased either 
in the latter part of 1931 or the e•arly part -of 1932 . 
. We shall diseuss the connection of the defendant with 
0. P. Pearce in the portion of this brief under the sub-
je-ct ''Suits Pending.'' 
say: 
In the second paragraph on page (6), respondents 
'''Beckstead would then m.ake his d·ea.l for this 
'hot ·st-ock' directly with the stockbroker and by 
this method was able to divoree himself from of-
fi:cial and .first hand knowledge of the wholes~ale 
· ·swindles which were ·being perpetrated up·on his 
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stockholders, 'vhereby they 'vere traded out o£ 
their holdings in his eorporation. '' 
We are at a loss to know exa.ctl~,. what respondents 
mean by the term '·'hot''. \\:'"e know of no provision of 
law that ·renders corporate stock either contra·band or 
an unlawful ·article of commerce merely be\cause the 
stockhold'er has traded, sold or given it to someone. 
Counsel refers to ~ '1vholesale swindles''. Another in-
stance of a resort to accusation, unsupported by p-roof. 
Another instance of what Counsel hoped to prove but 
couldn't. Not one of the former stockholders from 
~fontana ra1ne before th·e C:ourt protesting the transfe-r 
and sHle of their stock. The only stockholders who have 
made complaint were the stockholders within the State 
of Utah who were ·contacted by 0~ P. Pearce, and as to 
these ·stockholders and these transactions we shall make 
appropriate con1ment later on. 
Counsel, after making the statements referred to, 
is then satisfied "rith saying: 
''Thus it is clear that the trading in stock 
ca.me not as a result of the depres.sion, but fr.om 
a deliberate .planned S'C:h·eme _to convert all the 
corporation's assets to the individual use and 
profit of Beckstead.'' 
Respondent does not refer to testim·ony in the record 
supporting this statement. There is no justiHcation for 
this statement in the record. The C'Ourt made no finding 
which would supp·ort it, ~and again we -call the Court's at-
tention to the fact that the respondents proved the 
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~mpe~uniosi ty and insolvency of B·eckstead, and we sug-
gest that if he has been engaged for twelve or fourteen 
years in ·carrying out a s-cheme and plan to steal and 
convert the assets and stock of the corporation to his 
O'\Vn use, his efforts to the present time at least have 
been entirely fruitless. 
Fron1 Exhibit 15, at page ( 4) it appears that 1804 
shares of preferred stock, par value $100.00 a share •and 
2244 ·Shares of comn1on sto!(:k ·Of no par value have been 
repurchased by the corporation. 
In paragraph (8) at the bottom of page (6), Re-
spondents' Brief, it is st·ated that the stockholders sold 
this stock due to the systematic and habitual evil prac-
tices of B·eckstead, ·and due to the false and fraudulent 
representations made to his stockholders. 
The only evidence in the record which renders any 
support to this statement whatsoever is the testimony 
of the witness, 0. P. Pearce. It is •admitted that late 
in 1935 and near the end .of the period during which the 
corporation purchased any of its ·own stock P·earce con-
t,acted a limited nu1nber of people .and made certain rep-
resentations. Later on in this brief we shall comment 
on thes·e transactions. With this exception there is no 
evidence in the record whatsoever to support this pro-
position. The record clearly sho,v.s that the vast ·majority 
of t'he stock purchased \Va·s purchased from stockbrokers. 
H·ow they procured the stock, where, or under what ·cir-
cuinstances, does not appear. The only thing that does 
appear is that these stockbrokers had no connection what-
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soever \Yith either Beckstead or the United Bond and 
Fina.n·ce Corporation. 
In connection \Yith the ''ryoming ranches mentioned 
on page (7) -of respondents' brief, appears a most in-
teresting statement : 
''Had Beckstead died in the meantime the 
ranches most cert~ainly would have been a part 
of his estate and title thereto would have passed 
to the heirs.'' 
We are rather interested in just what eounsel 's con-
~eption of the la-\v in regard to matters ·of that kind can 
be. The evidence is ·clear, convincing and uncontradicted 
that Beckstead and his wife immediately after the prop-
erty 'vas acquired, by good and sufficient \Varranty deed, 
conveyed it to the United Bond and Finance Corpo~ation. 
The United .Bond and Finance Corporation owned the 
property. T·he audits of the <Corporation showed it. 
Financial statements to stockholders sho"' ... ed it, and cer-
tainly if Beckstead had died, the United Bond and Fin-
anee Corpof!ation would have had all its property, and 
the mere fact that the .deed was unrecorded would have 
made no difference whats-oever in this situation. We 
had thought that the findings of the Court would have 
forever quieted counsels' harping about the transfer 
of the Wyoming ranches to Beckstead. The Court did 
not and would not find that Beckstead ever converted 
or n1isappropriated or ev-er intended to convert or mis-
appropriate any of this Wyoming property to his own 
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use or .to the use ·of any other person, not the owner 
t~ereof. It is stated that: 
"The title remained in Beckstead's name in-
divid'IJ,,ally for about three years." 
The statement is not only fals·e and positively un-
true, but its untruth appears from the evidence in this 
case. 
The latter paragraph on page (7) contains another 
accusati·on to the effect that -Beckstead transferred this 
property to its rightful owner, the United B·ond and 
Finance Corporation, only after ''heat was applied.'' 
We ask, what beat, and by whom, and where is there 
any .evidence in the rec·ord to support ·Such a. ridiculous 
accusation~ 
All the facts with re.spect to the organization of the 
Beckstead Livestock Company, and the acquirement by 
it and the United Bond and Finance Corporation of 
property in Wyoming are hefore the Court and have 
been commented on at length in our previous briefs. 
Suffice it to say the evidence conclusively shows that the 
affairs of the Beckstead Livestock C·ompany have been 
handl·ed in an honest, uprigh_t and lawful manner. 
Answering paragraph (10) on page (8) of respond-
ents' brief, it was definit·ely testified fhat the mortgage 
indebtedness on the Wyoming ranches was less than 
$14,000.00. T·he statement that the affairs of the Live-
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st.ock Conlpany and Finance Corporation are interwoven 
and intermingled will be answered hereafter. 
Counsel states that: 
~'N.o one can tell whether the United Bond and 
Finance Corporati<>n is solvent or not.'' 
\Y. e are wondering whether or not respondents are: 
~nggesting that the Court guess about this situation. The: 
evidence is that the corporation is solvent and there is 
no evidence to the contrary. The ·certified publi~c ac-
eountant, Mr. \Vood, testified that it was solvent from 
the standpoint that its .assets ex·ceeded its liabilities, and 
als-o fr·om the standpoint that it was in such financial 
condition as would :permit it to pay its current liabilities 
on time, as well as ·any payments on long term mortgages 
and contracts. To say nothing a~bout the bur;den of proof, 
if this matter still be at is.sue. It is also stated t'h.at: 
''The books and records of the corporation 
are in the posse-ssion of B-eckstead.'' 
In whose possession should they be, may we ask~ 
Beekstead is the President and General Manager of the 
company, and certainly is by la"v charged with the eus-
tody ·of thes·e records and with their protection. 
It is also stated that: 
'
1
' Some of the record.s of the ·corp·oration are 
missing and hav·e been destroyed.'' 
The only missing records which we know of are the 
records in possession -of the respondents which pertain 
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. to the affairs of the· Inve·stors Thrift. How -or in what 
manner, or under w.hat circumstanc-es respondents be-
came possessed of these re·cords does not a.pp.e.ar. 
; It is also .stated that: 
'''The only a·ccess plaintiffs have had to the 
books .and re-cords is when a. part ·Or portion there-
. ·· of was produced in Court during the trial.'' 
We now ask the responde~n:ts if they desire access to 
the. fHC.Ords ~ c·ertainly they have never been refused 
such access. All records they requested were produced 
in Court, and every ·opportunity to examine them was 
afforded. 
FACTS 
""Wny counsel -calls this subdivisi·on of the brief ''the 
facts'' is not apparent after comparing the statements 
made with the reeord. H·e starts out hy what is to us 
rather .an immaterial missta.ten1ent, but he says that 
Green is a brother-in-lavv of Beckstead and Bradsha-\v. 
This is not true, either in the record or as a matter of 
fact. 
The next paragraph in this se-ction relates to the 
use by the ·corporation .of the words "United States," 
and reference is made to it a.s fraudulent in design and 
constituting spurious advertising, and in violation of 
Federal laws. 
This is another '' typi·c:al case'' .of counsel bringing 
in n1atters which are entirely immaterial and outside of 
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the issues. For the first time we hear that he relies 
upon this fart as justifying· lsQmething-apparently re-
ceiYersbip. 
Counsel evidently droes not think he is bound by 
either the pleading-s ·or the findings of the Court. Thi~s 
is typical throughout his statement of ''the ~acts.'' 
·Counsel apparently ·gets some comfort in making· 
out his case that the United Bond and Finance Corpora-
tion \Yas started ·out upon ''the proverbial shoe string.'' 
The most interesting of success stories abound with 
other similar instances and furthermore initial ·corporate 
poverty is not a ground for receivers·hip. The fact that 
the eoi:npany was started on a shoe string is no evidence 
of any fraudulent intent, and ·cannot supp·ort plaintiffs' 
case either as to the accounting or as to grounds for 
receivership. The Court made no ·finding upon this p-ro-
position. Tlie plaintiff as a matter of pleadings did not 
rely upon it, so we :submit that it is entirely immaterial 
to any of the issues of this case. 
Counsel says that the note given by Beckstead for 
the shares of preferred stock originally· issued to him 
was never paid. As pointed -out in appellants' brief, the 
Court g,o found. We think W'e have conclu.sively sh-own 
that the evidence does not support that finding. Coun-
sel refers to a number ·of pages in the transcript as 
justifying this finding. 
We submit that the evidence set forth on pages 
1663 and 1715 of the transcript -clearly indi•ca.tes that 
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the note was paid; that is, the ·Corpor·ation. received 
money fro-m the .sale of these shares of stock sufficient 
to wipe out the note. 
Complaint is made that the stockh-olders supplied 
all the capital. w.e do not believe this fact is any 
grounds £or a receivership or for an aecounting. Stock-
ho-lders are usually the one~s who put up the .capital of 
the corporation. It is not contended that there wa.s any 
fraud in the sale of the stock to stockholders. They knew 
what they were getting. The certificates which they 
purchased indicated what they vvere getting. Those who 
put in ·capital and received certificates which did not 
·entitle them to vote knew what they were getting. They 
were \Yi1ling to invest their money in this typ·e of .corpo-
ration as :an investment. It may be that they did not 
realize from their investment what they had anticipated 
they would, but during the years from 19'31 until almost 
the present time, what :Corporation has paid what the 
stockholders believed they \vould o'btain when they in-
vested their money during the boom years of 1927-19~31. 
Under this subdivision of respondents' brief, they 
state that the corporation was organized under the laws 
of the State of Utah, yet it did not comply ·with the Utah 
Securities Act, nor did it apply for a license to sell its 
stock in Utah. 
Why has counsel placed this statement in his brief~ 
It is not alleged in the complaint; it is not found by the 
Court; it does not tend in any way to support any find-
ing of the Court. No proof was introduced on this matter 
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at the trial. Here again is an after thought of counsel, 
seeking to grab at straws to justify his position. 
BECKSTEAD HAs ABsoLUTE ·CoNTROL OF ·CoRPORATION 
Beckstead \Yas one -of the original organizers of the 
company, :and the only original organizer \Yho has stayed 
on "~th the con1p~any. Since the time the other organizers 
left the con1pany he has controlled it. That he does, is 
neither grounds for a reeeivership nor an a:ecounting. 
It is like\Yise a. 'vell kno"rn fa·c.t that practically all~c.orpo­
rations are controlled during their ·entire lif.e by the same 
stockholder or san1e g·roup of stockholders. 
,, '·Coi\IE-ON DIVIDENDS'' 
From 1927 to 1931 the corporation was selling its 
stock in several states. Things looked good f.or a busi-
ness of this type. Stockholders, of course, who were 
buying on installm:ent contracts were encouraged to pay 
up the contracts in order that they .could obtain the di-
vidends "\Yhich the .corporation was paying. It is stated 
that no dividends except a very small one have heen paid 
since July, 1931. It IS infered from this that 
sometbing was wrong with the payment of dividends 
between 192.7 -19'31, and that the failure to pay since that 
time has been for the purpose of discouraging stock-
holders and making them desire to get rid of their stock. 
No evi,dence of this is in the re-cord. The fact is that a 
depression stopped the sales of stock of the Finance 
Corporation, and that same depression created a condi-
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tion wherein payment of intere.st and principal on mort-
gages. were not being made by house ho1ders. Counsel 
entirely overlook~ or refuses to .SHe this .situation. In 
any event no reliance was ba.sed upon the payment of 
dividends or th~ failure to p:ay dividends so far as the 
~complaint is concerned, and no finding was made upon 
this subject. 
TRADING INVESTORS OuT OF THEIR STocK 
Here counsel refers to diver.s methods, devices, 
agencies, instrumen;talities and corporations used lhy 
Beckstead to trade finance corporation stockholders out 
of their stock. He states that experience~ se,curities 
salesmen, traders and stock pickers were .contaeted, and 
that sucker li.sts of the finance ·corporation stockholders 
. were. furnished to these ''pickers.'' 
' . 
The only. persons B·eckstead -contacted in connection 
.with obtaining corp-orate stock so far as the evidence is 
·COncerned were Arthur J. Smith, Frank c·. Rich and 
'0. P. p:earce. Rich and Smith were given one list of 
Finance Corporation stoekholders. · At trans~cript, page 
536, Rich testified that he made copies of this list. So 
all of these ''sucker lists'' referred to by respondents 
narrows do\Yll to one list given to Rich and Sn1ith, and 
then to follo"\v this to its conclusion, one unit of stock in 
the United B·ond and Finance Corporation was obtained 
by these two ''experienced pickers.'' 
: Another interesting thing is that Rich, Smith and 
Pearce \Yere not engaged until October, 1935. By that 
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titne almost a.ll the stock pur·chased by the e.orporation 
had been pur-chased. The stock picked up since that 
tin1e amounts to very little. The stock ol)tained by Pearce 
"Tas almost entirelv stock in the .Investors T.hrift a~d ~ot 
the United Bond ~nd Finance Corporation. · The fact of 
the matter i~, as sho"'n ·by the testimony Pearce obtained 
Finance Corporation stoek from three individuals only, 
Mr. and Mrs. '''ils-on of Park City, Raymond Hofman of 
Randolph and Dr. Petty of Cedar City. 
Counsel then refers to various kinds of papers which 
'vere used in making these trades. He refers to whiskey 
warehouse receipts. Not one unit of stock in the Fin-
ance Corp·oration was ever obtained in. ex·change for 
whiskey warehouse receipts, in fact it appears that the 
Finance Corporation never at any time owne·d or pos-
sessed such .as receipt. He then refers to participating 
certificates in oil companies. Not one share or unit of 
stock in the Finance Corporation was. obtained hy it in 
exchange for any such certificates. There is no proof 
that the corporation ever owned, possessed or ex~hanged 
any sueh interest. Interest in oil lease royalties is then 
referred to, but no stock .ot the Finance C·o'rporation was 
obtained from .stockholders by the us·e of any such in-
terests. True it is that Mads-en obtained stock 
from P-ogliano by the exchange of ·some such interest, 
but his own testimony is that he was working in his O\Vll 
behalf .at that time and certainly the ·evidence will not 
support a statement that these intere.sts 'vere used by 
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B·eckstead or any agent or representative of the Finance 
Corporation. 
Stoek of Investors Thrift is referred to, but it should 
he noticed that this stock was not used for e:x!change pur-
poses after the month of June, 193'2-more than eight 
years before the bringing of this action. 
'0. P. Pearce used stock of the American Keene 
Plaster .and Cemerit Company in obtaining certificates of 
stock in the Finance C'orpora.tion from the Wilsons, Ray-
mond Hofman and Dr. Petty. These matters will be 
com1nented upon at length hereinafter. 
All the way thr.oug'h the brief respondents continu- · 
ously r·efer to the stock of the American Keene Plaster 
and Cement Company as ·being worthless, intimating that 
neither the stock nor the company has any value what-
soever. Evidently respondents rely upon the testimony 
of Ezra Gull, Dr. Petty and Raymond H.ofman to sup-
port this proposition. The witness Gull admitted that 
he had no knowledge \Vhatsoever as to the value of the 
a:s~sets of the American Keene Plaster and Cement c·om-
pany, nor \Yith respect to its business. He based his 
testimony that the stock had no 1narket value upon in-
vestigations he had made from stockholder·s and others 
who informed him that there was no stock for sale at 
any price on the market, and that they knew of no de-
mand for any such stock. The evidence "\Vas that the 
stock of this -corporation has never been on the market 
and that no market value was ever e-stablished for· it. 
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The evidence of Crandall 1s to the effect that the 
corporation is actively engag-ed in business, has eonsid-
erable property,- including- a plant, land, leases, mineral 
rights, trucks and equip1nent, and that f.or the year 1939, 
it paid a F'ederal inco1ue tax. 
Complaint is 1nade to the effe·ct that the corporation 
purchased its O\Yn bonds from investors for sixty cents 
on the dollar. 
,,~e are ''ondering just ,, ... hat form of mismanage-
ment such practice involves. If Beckstead, as manager 
of the corporation,. had not pur·chased such bonds at that 
price " ... hen offered to him, he vvould have been imp.roperly 
per£orming his duties as manager. The irony of 
the situation is further n1ade manifest when ·it ·ap-
pears that the plaintiffs who were the benefieiaries 
of these transactions have shown no disposition to reject 
the benefits derived therefrom. To the question: ''Why 
should an investor holding an obligation of a solvent 
-corporation accept sixty ·cents on a dollar in payment 
of such bonds, we frankly say, we do not know and 
besides what difference does it make. What we do say, 
is that any such investor holding a valid obligation o.f 
the defendant corporation can procure one hundred 
cents on a dollar upon such obligations. 
The attention of the Court is esp_ecially directed to 
the last paragraph, page. 23, o.f respondents' brief. It 
appears therefrom that the stock liability of the co;rpo-
ra.tion in the amount of $203,087.11 was retired and dis-
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charged: ·by tlie expenditure of $85,158.54 of corporate 
fund.~, representing a gain -to the corporation of $117, .. 
928.57. :1\$ pointed out in. our former hri~.f we yet are 
not advise~ as to the attitude of the respondents on these 
transaetions. Again w·e say, do they expect to retain 
the benefits or reject them~ If they intend to reject 
them, we would like to be advised a.s to how this is to 
he a!ecomplished, and. in what manner a. receiver would 
proceed to accomplish this rejection. On the other hand, 
a receiver .can be of no aid to the plaintiffs in retaining-
the benefits of these transactions. If they are to be 
retained no question should he raised concerning them 
here .. From all that appears in this record the Montana 
·sto.ckholders who sold and disposed of their stock are 
entirely satisfied with the transaction. The brokers ·evi-
dently are sa.tisfied because no complaint has been made 
by any of them. 
PoGLIANO Is DEFRAUDED O·uT OF Hrs SToCK 
Out of what stoek and by whom' The pathetic story 
of the defrauding of Pogliano set forth on page (24) of 
respondents' brief is worthy of note. 
It is true Art Madsen traded interests in oil land 
to Pogliano £or; his stock . It. is also true that Madsen 
had no connection whatsoever with the United 
Bond and Finance Corporation. P·ogliano indorsed 
his stock in 'blank and · delivered it to Madsen 
and Madsen sold and delivered the stock to a third 
party, Jaek Oldroyd. The United Bond and Finance 
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Corporation had n.othing to do with these transac-
tions, and before its attention was called to any matter 
that ".,.ould indicate dissatisfaction on the part of Pog-
liano, the defrauding· of Pogliano, if he \Yas defrauded, 
had already been accomplished and the stock had foun? 
its way into the hands of an innocent third party. Be~k~ 
stead "~as faced ''Tith a matter demanding decision .. 01;1 
his part. The secretary and treasurer .of the corpora-
tion had taken the sto~.k from Oldroyd and had given him 
a receipt for it "~thout consulting B·eckstead. Oldroyd· 
demanded a transfer of the stock. .Beckstead decl~ned 
to make the transfer and Oldroyd threatened suit for: 
conversion. Be.ckstead decided that for the safety o.f the. 
corporation the best thing that he could do was buy the 
stock, and this he did. Even though it is taken as estab-
lished that Pogliano was defra.u.ded out of his stock, still 
the record sho\YS that the officers of the United Bond 
and Finance Corporation were in no way conne-cted \vith 
this transaction and \vere in no way guilty of any fraud 
as far as Pogliano was .concerned, and, by the way, this 
Pogliano transa-ction in the fall of 1939 \Vas the last· in-· 
stance involving a purchase of its own stock by the 'fin-
ance corporation. The statement that,· ''hut. f·o,r ; this 
litigation'' Beckstead would still be pickin·g up ·stock, 
is nothing but a mere assumption on the part of the 
writer of the brief, is not supported by any ·evidence, but 
is contrary thereto, tihe evidence being that the repur-
.chase of stock by', the corporation for all practical , pur-
poses ended in July, 1936. 
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H. ·0. L. ·C. LoANs oN CoRPORATION's PROPERTY 
The first paragraph under this title leaves us in a 
state of amazement. 
Respondents sta,te that to obtain funds with which to 
buy up the corporation'.s own stock, Mr. Beckstead bor-
rowed money on property -of the United Bond and Fin-
ance Corporation from the Home Owners' L~oa.n C·orpo-
ration. 
We were of the impression that everyone knew that 
the H:ome Owners' Loan Corporation eould not and 
'vould not loan money to a corporation, and the evidence 
clearly .shows that the corporation never borrowed any 
money or funds whatsoever from the Home Owners' 
Loan Corporation. The company did hold mortgages on 
home's as mortg·agee, and the mortgagors, after applica-
tion n1ade to the Home Owne~s' Loan Corporation, ob-
tained loans and the Finance Corporation was paid off in 
hond·s of the H-ome Owners' Loan Corporation. The 
evidence is that some of thes.e bonds thus obtained were 
used by the Finance Corporation in the purchas·e of its 
own stook, but to say that these funds -were obtained for 
that purpose is not only inaccura·te but is contrary to 
the evidence. 
'''LITTLE PoucH'' 
Intimations are contained in the statements made 
under this title that the whole scheme of purchasing this 
stock was to provide a method whereby Beckstead could 
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steal, embezzle and \Yrongfully convert the s:tock so ac-
quired to his O\\~n use. If it is as~sumed without p.roof 
that these \Yere his intentions then it n1ay be that some 
of the suggestions made under this title are pertinent. 
If, however, it is assumed until the contrary is proved, 
at least by ~some evidence that he "\Vas acting as any other 
honest manag-ing officer would have acted under ~imilar 
circumstances, then there is nothing unusual or irre·gular 
or unlawful in the manner in which this sto~ck was 
handled. 
The attention of the C·ourt is invited to the comments 
on these matters contained in the three audits, to which 
reference has heretofore been n1ade. It appears from 
the audit n1a.de by Beesley and V\r ood for the year 19"35 
that prior to 1935 stock repur.chased -vvas immediately 
cancelled and retired. This practice brought up the 
question as to \Yhether or not the gains resulting there-
from were income, and taxable as such. It was upon 
the advice -of the a.udi tors that the stock purchased there-
after ,,~as held, and later regularly transferred to 
the ·corporation, and this in January of 1940, long before 
the ·eommencement .of thi~s suit. 
The follo,ving statement appears on page (26) of 
the brief: 
"The stock '"\vas just held' (Tr. 838) in 'a 
little pouch' .and permitted to 'accumulate' (Tr. 
910) until litigation. arose, 'vhen transfer eerti-
·cate No. 872, da:ted J·anua.ry 10, 19·40, f.or five 
hundred thirty-one (5·31) shares of the 'accum-
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ulated' stock was issued to United Bond and Fin-
ance ·Cnrporation (Tr. 857).'' 
We· are at a loss to kno\v in what \vay .counsel can 
justify· ,such a ·statement. The rec-ords show that litig-a-
tion involving these matters did not arise until March 
G, 1940 \Vhen the Court \vithout notice to the appellants 
and in an ex-parte hearing, appointed an ancillary re-
~c.eiver, the order appointing such receiver being soon 
thereafter properly vacated. 
The Court is invited by respondents to become the 
ac·cusers of the officers of this corporation without any 
evidence· or findings to support such aocusation. \Ve 
refer to staten1ents made at the bottom of page 25: 
''How ~simple to write in the name of a. trans-
feree of the stock certificates~ 
''How eonvenient to have ail the certificates 
together in 'a little pouch'~'' 
W·e .c.ould go on and say how simple it is to commit 
any kind or manner of crin1e; how simple it is to do 
any one of a great number of things fro,Yned upon by 
the la\v of the land and public opinion if one he so in-
clined. The mere fact that the a!(~complishn1ent of thes·e 
acts is .. simple does not Inean that they will probably 
be aceomplished. The simplicity .of accomplishment is 
not proof of intent. The .faet is, all of the stock of the 
corporation was safely kept and none appropriated. The 
testimony is uncontradicted, that for many years the 
opportunity has continuously existed for Beckstead to 
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do the things which it is intimated be intended to do, but 
he ha.s never ·carried into execution, any of . these evil 
intentions. What better proof is there of his honesty 
and .freedom from eYil intention v! 
Complete and accurate records were at all times kept 
of the stork obtained by the corporation. It is an ·odd 
thing that such accurate records \Yould be kept if Beck-
stead intended to appropriate any of this stock to his own 
use. It may be pertinent to observe that throughout the 
conduct of these proceedings, in their complaint, in 
their arguments to the Court, and in all the briefs 
written, the respondents have made these various charges 
.and accusations against Beckstead, but singulai'"ly they 
haYe been unable to prove any of them. They have 
proved that all of the property of the corporation is now 
safely in its possession and under its. control. They 
have proved that Beckstead is impecunious. They did 
not produce any evidence upon which the trial · Court 
was willing to find that there had been any misappropria-
tion or fraudulent or unlawful diversion of -corporate 
assets by Beckstead. Nevertheless, without evidence 
and without proof, but merely because conditions existed 
which made it possible to steal, take and embezzle the 
property of the corporation, respondents conclude and 
argue that Beck!stead from the outset has actually in-
tended to wrongfully and unlawfully convert this prop-
erty. 
Re.spondents' strongest evidence in support ;c)t their 
ac-cusation that Beckstead intended to steal the stock was 
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in the testimony of Gull set forth on pages 26 and 27 of 
the brief. According to that testimony B·eckstead ad-
mitted to Gull that the company had possession of the 
stock ·certificates indorsed in blank, and that upon advice 
from the auditors they were being so held by the corpo-
ration, until an appropriate time when the cancell~tions 
w.ould be regularly and properly made. 
In ans\ver to the clis.c.ussion under the title "Inves-
tors Thrift c·orporation'' we respectfully refer the Court 
to our discussion of this n1a tter at pages 149-152 of our 
original brief. 
AMERICAN KEENE CEMENT & PLASTER CoMPANY 
JoNEs INvESTMENT CoMPANY 
Two n1atters only are worthy of notice in reply to 
the argument under this title. The American Keene 
Cement & Plaster Company is a Utah Corpo:ration in 
good standing, presently engaged in business, and own-
ing substantial assets, and is being operated at a priofit. 
It.s ·stock has never been on the market, and the corpo-
ration was not financed through a stock selling promo-
tion scheme. 
With reference to the five thousand shares of stock 
issued by the corporation to Beckstead, it definitely 
appears from the evidence that the United Bond and 
Fin~nce Corporation received whatever value there was 
in this stock, and that it was all used to p·romote the 
welfare and best interest ~of the United Bond and 
Finance Corporation, and w·as not .sold or disposed of 
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by Beckstead for his own personal gain even though 
it "·as transferred to him personally . 
.. A.sHTox-JENKINs CoMPANY AND 
.... \sHTox-JENKINs INSURANCE CoMPANY 
In our original brief \Ve have discussed rather fully 
our Yie,Ys of the matters suggested by the above head-
ing, and 'Ye respectfully refer the Court to the discussion 
found at pages 33-44 in our original brief . 
. A .t page 33 respondents state : 
"\\~ith assets of l--:-nited Bond, including a 
ranch near Ogden valued at $20,000.00 (Tr. 1345), 
1Ir. Beckstead traded for the controlling stock of 
Eddie Jenkins in the Ashton-Jenkins Company.'' 
Counsel knows, and the record cited in our brief 
conclusively reveals that the only assets of the eorpo-
ration traded to ~fr. Jenkins was the ranch at Ogden. 
To intimate that other property was used "does violence 
to the facts and truth in this case.'' 
At the top of page 35 it is stated: 
''But a 0opy of this agreement, attached as 
Exhibit A to the complaint in c·ase No. 51249 
supra, shows that the agreement was with Wesley 
R. B~eckstead, individually, and not with the 
United Bond and Finan-ce or Investors Thrift 
Corporation ( Tr. 1364-1366). '' 
If counsel is interested in the Court being fully 
advised a.s to the facts. surrounding this transaction, why 
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does he not continue the statement and say that on the 
day the contra~t was made with Beckstead it was fully 
and completely assigned by him to the Investors Thrift 
Corporation. The same statement may also be made 
\vith re.spect to the assignment of claims made to Mr. 
Beckstead mentioned on page 35 of the brief. 
Exhibit V-4 and W-4 set forth the complete transac-
tion involving the purchase ,of the Ashton-Jenkins Insur-
ance Company. Counsel states that the original agree-
ment was lost, but that a oopy was produced. 1V e ask 
the Court to examine Exhibit V-4 and W-4. It is appar-
ent that they are the original agreements in this trans-
action and are not copies thereof. On the back of the 
agreement, V-4, and the back of the assignment, W-4, 
appears an assignment by Wesley R. Beckstead assign-
ing and conveying t.o t_he Investors Thrift Corporation 
all his right, ti tie and interest in and to the agreement 
and assignment. On the receipt contained in Exhibit 
V-4, which is signed by the Ashton-Jenkins Insurance 
Company, and others, it appears that the check given 
for the purchase price of the insurance business was a 
eheck of the United Bond and Finance Corporation. If 
Beckstead was intending· to use money for his o\vn per-
Stonal benefit and appropriate it to his own use, why 
would such a complete record be made of this transac-
tion showing the connection of the .companies repre-
sented by Th1r. Beckstead to this business transaction. 
This matter is of no great importance to the Court 
herein. As we pointed ~out in our original brief these 
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Inatters were all terminated approximately t~n years 
prior to the bringing· of this snit. ''T e bring then1 to the 
Court's attention merely to show that here, as in othe·r 
parts of the brief, an a tten1pt is being made· to influence 
·the Court by presenting a part of a transaction only. 
,,~ YO~IIXG RANCHES AND INVESTMENTS. 
In appellants' original brief matters pertaining to 
the investment in the ,, ... yoming ranches and lives.tock 
were discussed fully, and the attention of the Court 
\Yas called to pertinent evidence appearing in the record 
in regard to these transaction·s. There are a. few mat-
ters, however that we feel should be mentioned herein. 
Respondents' claim tha:t Beckstead purchased these 
ranches as a part of a scheme to defraud the United 
Bond ·and Finance Corporation out of its property, and 
that he has attemptHd from the first to wrongfully divert 
and misappropriate to his own use and benefit the prop-
erty and funds of the United Bond and Finance Corpo-
teration by this device. The witness, George W. Smith's 
testimony lends some support to the ·Claim. He was the 
ancillary receiver of this 'iVyoming property appointed 
exparte and without notice by the District Court of 
Uinta County, Wyoming, in ~!arch, 19·40. His interest 
was apparent throughout. App·ellants submit. that this 
witness is not worthy of belief. Certainly the intimation 
as to Beckstead's intenti~ons have been completely dis-
proved. 
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The own~r~hip of this property by the United Bond 
and Finance Corporation has always been recognized 
by Beckstead. It was up to the managing officers to 
deter1nine whether. or not they would qualify the United 
Bond and Finance Corp·oration to do business in Wyo-
ming, or whether they should organize a Livestock Cor-
poration in Wyoming for that purpose. They decided 
to ·adopt the latt~r ·course, but there never has been an 
instant when the property rights of the United Bond 
and Fin~nce C·orporation have not been fully and ade-
quately protected. 
·Counsel can talk about the ''unrecorded deed" to 
his heart's content, but he cannot show that either the 
'corporation or these plaintiffs have ever suffered any 
loss as a result of the.se transactions or that any of 
their property rights have ever been endangered thereby. 
It is stated that numerous stockholders of the United 
Bond and Finance Corporation called on Ezra Gull, then 
director of the Utah Securities Commission concerning 
the taking of the title to the Wyoming ranch property 
in the nan1~ of Beckstead, individually. Something was 
said to this effect by Gull. It is funny that no complain-
ing stockholder was produced at the trial, and that the 
Court was required to rely entirely upon the loquacious 
testimony .of. ~his vigorous public servant. 
With respect to the Densley-B,eckstead sheep trans-
~ction, the evidence cle:arly supports the proposition that 
these sheep became a part of the assets of the Beckstead 
Livesto-ck C.ompany, that no claim ~ras ever asserted 
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to them by Beckstead; tha.t he never ap·propriated any 
of the income t{)r any of the sheep, for that matter; to 
his O\Yn use or benefit. 
Here ag-ain \Ve run into an after thought of counsel. 
Xothing \vith respect to this n1atter is found in the plead-
ings. There is no findings of fact in regard thereto and 
the decree does not in any way mention these sheep. 
They are not an issue in the case and have no relevancy 
of any kind. 
BEcKSTEAD LIVESTOCK CoMPANY 
It is interesting to note that respondents are not 
clear a.s to whether or not they want all of the stock 
of this corporation to be owned by the United Bond 
and Finance Corporation, or whether it would be better 
for a lesser amount to be owned by it. Of one thing there 
can be no question, and that is that the United Bond 
and Finance Corp·oration owns the Beckstead Livestock 
Company, lock, stock and barrel. 
THE WILSONS-A TYPICAL CASE 
NuMERous SuiTs PENDING 
SwiNDLE OF SToCKHOLDERs 
"'~ e shall make our reply to these three subheads 
without separation. 
The main prop supporting respondent's c~se wa.s the 
testim1ony of 0. P. Pearce. Among other things Pearce 
admitted that he made false statements to the people 
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he .contacted, admitted his conviction of felony, admitted 
his own personal interest in the transactions. No effort 
has ever been made by appellants to excuse or justify 
these acts. \~V e have pointed ·out that the corporation 
has in good faith made every effort to rectify these 
wrongs and to restore to every stockholder or' former 
stockholder, contacted by Pierce the stock procured by 
him. 
Neither the Wils~ons nor any other former stock-
holder mentioned under these sub-titles of respondents' 
brief are plaintiffs in this action. A valiant attempt was 
made by respondents to bolster up whatever case they 
had by espousing the cause of these people. It appears 
that the \\Tilsons, the Hofmans, the Jacksons, Dr. Petty 
and others had been at one time stockholders of the 
United Bond and Finance Corporation. Most of then1 
many years ago traded all or part of their United Bond 
and Finance Corporation stock for Investors Thrift stock. 
In 1935 they tra.ded their Investors Thrift stock ·and 
whatever stock in the United B·ond and Finance Corpo-
ration they then posse'ssed for stock in the American 
Keene Plaster & Cernent Company. 
In November of 1938 these stockholders connnenced 
suits in the Third Judicial Di,strict Court in and for the 
County of Salt Lake against W. R. Beckstead, Willian1 
L. Christensen, Boyd Evans and the United Bond and 
Finance Corporation, .said actions being No. 62150 and 
62151. ' 
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In 62150 John ~1. ''7ilson and l\fayme Wilson were 
plaintiffs. In their ·complaint they set forth nine differ-
ent causes of aetion. The first cause \Yas for rescission 
and restoration of their stock in the United Bond and 
Finance Corporati~on. The second cause seeking similar 
relief \Yas broug-ht as assig-nee for Pearl L. Jackson of 
Randolph, Utah. The third cause, seeking similar relief 
was brought as assig-nee of Pauline and Henry Hofman. 
The fourth cause, seeking· similar relief was brought as 
assignee of Raymond Hofman and Lillian A. Hofman. 
The fifth cause, seeking similar relief was brought as 
a-ssignee of F. H. Petty ·of Cedar City, Utah. The sixth 
cause, seeking similar relief was brought as assignee of 
D. H. Hyatt and La Verna Hyatt of Parowan, Utah-. The 
seventh cause, seeking sin1ila.r relief was brought as 
assignee of lVIelbourne DeMille and Jennie DeMille. The 
eighth cause, seeking similar relief was brought as as-
signee of Nellie and Orravell Kapple of Payson, Utah. 
The ninth cause, seeking similar relief was brought as 
assignee of John R. Robinson of Paragonah, Utah. 
In case 62151 the plaintiff is Margaret Thurman. 
Her con1plaint contains t\YO causes of action. The first 
seeks rescission_ and restoration of plaintiff's stock in 
the United Bond and Finance Corporation. The second 
seeking the same relief, \vas brought a.s assignee of Ida 
R. Thurman of Lehi, Utah. 
In our .original brief, at page 155 et cetera, we stated 
that for several years an offer of rescission previously 
made had remained open to all of thes·e people, and 
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that ,said offer of :rescission was renewed in good faith. 
Our brief· was filed in this court on the 27th day of 
August, 1941. 
The attorneys for plaintiff in suits Nos. 62150 and 
62151 'are Irvine, .Skeen and Thurman. They likewise 
are attorneys for respondents here. 
Respondents' brief was filed in this Court on the 
27th day of November, 1941. The records and files in 
the County Clerk's office ,of Salt Lake County, show 
that on the 6th day of Octo her, 1941, upon motion of 
attorneys· for the plaintiffs, that is to ·say, upon n1otion 
of Irvine, Skeen and Thurman, it was ordered by the 
Honorable Bryan P. Leverich, one of the Judges of the 
said C·ourt, that the said actions, C'ase Nos. 6'2150-62151, 
be, and they were thereby, dismissed with prejudice, 
at plaintiffs' costs. 
\\T e would not mention these matters herein, being 
conscious of the rule that limits the consideration of 
matters on appeal to matters appearing .from the record 
if it were not for the fact that a representation has been 
made here to the effect that the Wilsons, the Hofmans, 
the Jacksons, the Thurmans, Frank Petty, and many 
others, are no"r seeking relief in the Courts, and that 
numerous suits are now pending, when as a matter of 
fact 'at the very time the brief was filed, attorneys, who 
\vere co-authors of the brief, well knew that these suits 
had been dismissed with prejudice and at plaintiffs' 
costs upon their own motion, and that the res·cissions so 
repeatedly ·offered by the app·ellants herein had been ac-
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oopted, and that all these people upon whose :shoulders· 
respondents haYe s-ought to stand had been·. restored to 
their status as stockholder·s in the United Bond and 
Finance Corporation. 
\\""" e say to the Court now, as we have said in our 
main brief, that over a period of years everything has 
been done that could be done by the .corporation to 
restore to these peo·ple, contacted by Pearce, their f·ormer 
status as stockholders. \V-hatever wrongs that have been 
done have been righted, and no, receivership has ever 
been or is no\v needed to accomplish this purpo~e. 
For the information of the Court while \Ve are on 
the subject of "numerous suits pending'', we say that 
there is ·only one suit p·ending against the United Bond 
and Finance Corporation in addition to this receivership 
action, and that is a suit by a former stockholder seek-
ing s-ome relief either damages or rescission, the exact 
nature of which cannot be determined from the plead-
ings. We have demurred to the complaint, the demurrer 
has stood unchallenged for almost eighteen months. 
Upon authority of our clients we now say that if the 
plaintiff therein will restore to the corporation the con-
,sideration received by her for stock sold, together with 
a reasonable rate ·of interest, she may be restored to her 
original status as a stockholder in the corporation. 
It may be pertinent to remark that all of these 
people and their ·counsel are evidently willing to do 
business with the defendant corporation and have suffi-
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·cient confidence in its management to accept stock therein 
in full and complete settlement of their claims. 
STOCKHOLDERS ARE WITHOUT REMEDY AT LAW. 
One of the most remarkable arguments which we 
have ever read is respondents' argument under this 
heading, starti~g at page 50 of their brief. In order to 
conclusively show and demonstrate that the plaintiffs 
are without a speedy and adequate remedy at law they 
say that various public officials and pri¥ate :attorneys 
were consulted, and that one of. these public officials, 
Ezra Gull, assigned the witness Rich to investigate the 
United B;ond and Finance Corporation, and that because 
the accomplishments of these officials and attorneys 
were unsatisfactory to respondents, the pr·oposition that 
they are ~rithout ren1edy at law is therefore conclusively 
established. In other words, respondents contend that 
because Gull "\Vas not able to require the hoard 
of dire·ctors of the United Bond and Finance 
CorptO·ration to do certain things which admittedly 
were ''none of Gull's bu.sines~s'' and because neither 
the United ,States District Attorney nor the United 
States Postal Inspector would or could procure an in-
dictment against the officials of the United Bond and 
Finance Corporation, and because the County Attor:Q.ey 
of .Salt Lake County would not undertake to force by 
criminal proceedings the manager of the corporation to 
permit an inspection of the books and reeords ,of the 
corporation by a person who had no legal or lawful right 
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to inspect said books~ and because attorney Horace ,J. 
I~no,vlton a11d the la\Y firm ·of IrYine, Skeen and Thur-
man \Yere eYidently unable to proeure for their clients 
relief satisfaetory to respodents, it therefore follows as 
a matter of la\Y that the stoekholders are \Yithout ren1edy 
at law . 
..~..\s far as any sho,ving made in this case is concerned 
it does not appear that the plaintiffs haiVe ever been 
interestecl in any remedy at law \Vhatsoever. Their sole 
interest from the outset has been receivership. They 
haYe entirelr failed, as pointed ·out in our original brief, 
to either allege or prove their right to any primary 
remedy \YhatsoeYer, to which receivership -c-ould he an-
cillary, and no effort \vhatsoever has been made 1n re-
spondents' brief to meet this argument. 
R,espondents are appalled at the idea of appellants 
appealing to this Court to set aside a decree of a Court 
of equity. It is our understanding that there is no 
Inore sanctity or sacredness in a decree of a Court of 
equity than in a judgment of a Court of law. B·oth are 
subject to review, both are subject to reversal if cause 
sufficient appears from the record. 
After ~disposing of the facts in the case respondents 
proceed with their argument. The sufficien·cy of the 
evidence is discussed in about one page and is supported 
by quotations from the "Prisoner of Chillon'' and from 
"Pope's Essay on Man," eiVidently the sturdiest author-
ities available to responden:ts. 
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. ,We assume from the lack of any argument whatso .. 
ever on the sufficiency o( the evidence, that none has 
occurred· to counsel's mind. Following the argument 
on the sufficiency: of. evidence, respondents address them-
, 
selves to a discussion ,of the sufficiency of the pleadings. 
The pleadings themselves are not discussed. A few 
authorities are quoted which standing alone perhaps 
eontain a correet and accurate statement of the law as 
pertaining to the facts of the particular case. "\\T e say 
that none ·of these cases support the proposition that a 
trial. :Court ·Can properly make findings and deeree on 
issues which are not raised by the pleadings. We have 
pointed out in our original brief numerous issues de-
termined by the Court which· were not raised by the 
pleadings~ w.e pointed out in our original brief the 
many instances wherein issues were raised by the plead-
ings, but not determined. The authorities cited by 
respondents under the argument ",sufficiency of plead-
ings'' do not meet these situations, but eontain mere 
general statements of law which are not in dispute in 
this case. 
Attention of the Court is called to the case of 
People's Bonded Tru.stee v. White, 72 Utah 587, 272 Pac. 
200, cited. at page 5.5 of respondents' brief. In that 
case it was ·contended on appeal that the appointment 
of a receiver wa.s null and void be-cause "' 2. The s·upple-
mental complaint ~do·es not state facts sufficient to invoke 
the jurisdi·ction of a Court in making said ordeT. '' 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
41 
Addressing itself to that proposition the Court used 
the lang11age rontained in the quotations from said case 
found in respondents' brief. The matters which we 
have raised in our original brief with respect to the 
sufficiency of the complaint do not relate to the question. 
of the sufficiency of the complaint to invoke the juris-
diction of the Court but are addressed to the question 
as to the sufficiency of the complaint with respect to 
issues deternrined by the Court, and the sufficiency of 
the complaint with respect to the relief granted by the 
court; the sufficiency of the complaint with regard to the 
accounting ordered by the Court. 
The arguments that we have made on these matters 
have been ignored by respondent, and the authorities 
cited by him have no relevancy whatsoever in· the de-. 
termination .of those issues. 
\\'ithin the time alloV\red by law the appellants de-
murred to respondents' original complaint on the ground 
that said complaint did not state facts sufficient to eon-
.sti tu te a cause of action. This demurrer was overruled, 
and thereafter appellants made answer. It has never 
been appellant's positio·n that respondents' complaint 
was not sufficient to invoke the jurisdi.ction of the 
Court. It has, however, been, and still is, appellants' 
position that the complaint was wholly insufficient to 
support the findings and the decree and the judgment 
of the Court as made at the conclusion ·Of the trial, and 
fron1 which this appeal has been prosecuted. 
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R·iant A1nuse1nent Company v. Bailey, 80 Col. 65, 
249 Pac. 7 is cited by respondents at page 56 of their 
brief. 
In that ease a trustee in bankruptcy of the United 
Coaleries Con1pany, bankrupt, brought a suit and had a 
decree against plaintiff in error that the latter owed 
the bankrupt estate $40,000 which was in equity a lien 
on the deqtor '.s property, and ordered the property 
sold to satisfy the lien. The basis of the action was the 
charge that one, vValker, who controlled both companies, 
had fraudulently diverted the funds of the Coaleries 
C~ompany to promote and establish the amusen1ent conl-
pany. After the case \Yas appealed the District Court 
appointed a receiver pending the proceedings on error. 
The An1usement Con1pany brought error and asked for 
a supersedeas on the receiver matter. 
There is no sin1ilarity ·either on the facts, the plead-
ings, the findings, nor the assignments of error, to the 
case at bar. 
The Court held, first, that the trial Court bad juris-
dicti~on to do all the things which it did, and that in the 
appointment of a receiver there was no abuse of dis-
cretion, that the evidence was sufficient to support the 
judg1nent. A reading of the facts in the case clearly 
~shows that it does not lend support to any proposition 
contrary to appellant's position herein. 
In Ellis v. Panther Oil and Gas Company, 171 Old. 
552, 42 P. (2d) 423 ·Cited by respondent, the defendant 
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appealed fron1 an order, refusing to vacate the appoint-
ment of a temporary receiver of certain property owned 
by defendant. The only matters presented by the ·appeal 
w·ere: 1. That the plaintiff's petition vvas insufficient to au-
thorize the appoint1nent of a receiver; 2. Error in not 
holding that plaintiff \vas a con1mon creditor and defend-
ant "~as the trustee for certain preferred creditors. It 
readily appears that a determination of either of these 
matters could not affect any issue ~or assignment of error 
presented on this appeal. Appellants here have not argued 
that the petition was insufficient to authorize the .appoint-
ment of a receiver. '': e have seriously contended that 
the petition does not sup·po·rt either the findings or de-
cree, and that vital issues presented by the pleadings 
were not determined by the Court but the sufficiency of 
the complaint, independent of these c-onsiderations, has 
not been argued. 
The case of Bryan v. Welch, 74 F. (2d) 964, involved 
proceedings under Section 77 B of the Federal Bank-
ruptcy Act, and the Court had before it the question as 
to whether or not a receivership of a trust in the State 
Court \Yas an equity receivership within the meaning 
of said Section 77 B. The Court held that there was sueh 
a receivership. Wherein this case iri any way supports 
respondents' contention we are at a loss to understand. 
It is .cited under the subhead ''Sufficiency of Pleadings.'' 
Apparently counsel is talking about the contention of the 
appellants that the decree and findings of fact are not 
supported by the pleadings. N·o such problem is dis-
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cussed or mentioned in the cited case, and the holding 
is limited entirely to questions involving ~said ·Section 
of the bankruptcy act . 
. An examination of the case's merely cited on page 58 
of respondents' brief will .show t1hat they a~e of no as-
sistance whats·oever in determining the questions pre-
sented here. 
Respondents' argument under the sub-title "Conduct 
of Trial Court'' hegins at page 59 of their brief. In 
characteristic fashion, respondents refer to appellants 
argument as being purely techincal .and without sub-
stance of fact or law. If there be no substance in the 
rule that requires a judgment and decree to be .supported 
by the findings and by. the pleadings, then perhaps there 
is no substance to our argument. If there is no ~sub­
stance to the rule that requires trial Courts to make 
:findings 01~ the rna terial issues pres en ted by the plead-
ings, then perhaps there is no substance to our argu-
ment. If th·ere is no substance to the rule th.at requires 
findings and decree to be supported by the evidence then 
there is no substance to our argwnent. If there be no 
substance to the rule that requires plaintiff, seeking a 
receiver, to plead and p:vove his right to a priinary 
remedy to which receivership can be .ancillary, then 
perhaps there is no .substance to our .argument. 
These fundamental and element1ary propositions are 
not discussed in respondent's brief. Respondents have 
not ·cited one single authority which casts any doubt 
upon the propositi,ons argued by appellants, and we 
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assun1e from lack of answer, either that respondents 
are unable to n1ake reply, or that they have failed ·to 
appreciate their significance. 
It is suggested that appellants were fearful of 
''facing the facts at the trial.'' We ,say in answer to 
this eharge, that we have newer had any fear of facing 
facts as distinguished from unsupported insinuations, 
assun1ptions and suspicions. We have, of course, ohj.ect-
ed to the proof of matter not even remotely suggested 
by the ·complaint. \\T e have objected to the findings of 
the Court on· issues not raised by the pleadings, and ·we 
have objected to a decree \\"'~hich require-s defendants 
to account for transactions which are not ma.de ma-
terial by any pleadings whatsoever. If these he tech-
nicalities, then we say these technicalities are of great 
importance and great value n·ot ~only to the Court. hut 
to litigants in saving them from the necessity of defend-
ing against ·Charges unplead, and ~of which they have no 
knowledge whatsoever until the testimony is offeJred at 
the trial. In spite .of the valiant effort -of respondents 
to connect various witnesses and people with plain-
tiffs' ease we ,still insist that appellants were not granted 
a fair and impartial trial. 
"\V.e are rather amused atl respondents' argument, 
commencing on page 67 under the· title ''A. W. Madsen 
Connected Up.'' With whom he has been "connected up" 
does not appear either from the record nor from th·e 
brief. He was called as a witness by the respondents. 
It definitely appeared that he never had any connection 
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were not involved in .any way a~s far as Madsen was con-
cerned with the acquirement -of the Pogliano stock. 
The exan1ina.tion and cross examination of 0. P. 
Pearce will no doubt be considered by the Court. In 
rnany respects the testim~ny of Pearce and Beckstead 
conflict. The Court must determine which of these wit-
nesses is more worthy of belief, Pearce, the convicted 
felon, and adn1itted prevaricator or Beckstead a business 
man, who by his ability and good management has been 
solely responsible for the success .of the defendant corpo-
ration. 
Respondent's version of the trial Court's act 
1n impounding the assets is presented -conrmencing at 
page 87 of their brief. N·o reason is shown justifying· 
the Court's action in this respect, and nn argument is 
made to the effect that said action was justified by any 
showing made at the time ·or prior thereto, nor was there 
a showing of any danger whatsoever -of loss of this fund. 
THE LAW 
CoRPORATION MAY NoT BuY ITs OwN STOCK 
Respondents' argument on this proposition consists 
of a citation ·of one provision of the Constitution of 
Utah, and several sections of the Revised Statutes of 
Utah, 1933, and the Utah ·Case of Pace v. Pace Brothers 
Oompany, 91 Utah 132. 
The interesting thing to note about this argument 
is that counsel cites no authority and makes no argu-
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ment to the effect that a purchas-e by a corporation of 
its own stock is grounds for a receivership or that .such 
act~Yity an1ounts to misn1anagement. 
''l1en the Court takes into consideration the facts 
and circumstances surrounding the purchase of thi~s .stock 
we believe it will be convinced that there was no misman-
agement in these purchases, but on the contrary, a 
prudent exercise of judgment in the management of the 
affairs of this ·corporation. Through the purchas.e of 
stock the remaining· stockholders including the re,spond-
ents have been benefitted. Their stock and the corpora-
ti,on itself are worth more than they otherwise would 
have been. 
A comparison of the facts presented in the Pace case 
with the facts presented here, viewed in connection with 
certain statements made by the Court in the Pace case, 
casts serious doubt on the proposition that the decision 
in the Pace .case makes unlawful the action of the cor-
poTation in the purchase ·of its own ~stock as disclosed 
by the record here. 
In the Pace case the corporation purchased a large 
amount of its outstanding stock from a member of a 
family .c.orporat~on, giving in payment ·certain promis-
sory notes secured by mortgages on,.~ll ·of its property. 
Unsecured creditors intervened in the action to foreclose 
these mortgages, claiming that the corporation had no 
power to purchase its own stock under the circumstances 
as dis-closed by the record. It appeared that the un-
secured creditors would lose their claims unless the note 
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·and mortgage: trahisactiorts were set aside. Judgment 
went against the interveners and they appealed on the 
ground that .. the property mortgaged to Sidney Pace 
.should he .appli{fable to the payment of their claims and 
.those of oth~r. unsecured creditor.s, on the ground that 
th~ mortgages. were not, valid for the. reason defendant 
" corporation had no power to buy its own stock. Amicus 
Curiae too~ the opposite position. The Court after 
stating the ~a.~ts made the following significant state-
ment: 
''We ·consider tJhe question as to whether the 
defendant corporation under the circumstances 
in whic;h. this purchase was made had authority 
to buy its own stock held by Sidney Pace. Our 
dccisio:n on that question will be limited strictly 
to the facts of this cal8e. '' · 
The Court reached the conclusion that under the 
facts of that ease Pace Brothers C·ompany could not buy 
in its own .stock and thereby defeat the claims of un-
. secured creditors. A reading .of the decision will .show 
that the c·ourt left open for future decision a determin-
:ation of the .instances wherein a corporation may law-
.fully buy in its ·own .stock. 
In the ·ca,se at bar the stock of the corporation was 
bought in to protect the corporation, to reduce its lia-
bilities;· and; to increase its ,surplus, and these lawful 
purposes were: accomplished. In this case the action is 
not brought by one who has suffered loss· or detriment, 
but i,s hroug:P.t by. those who have benefited and profited 
by these ~e:ry irans·action~. No. creditor secured or un-
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seeured \Yas in any particular damaged or injure« :by 
the purchases complained of . 
....-\.gain \Ye call the Court's attention to the fact that 
while respondents haYe neYer indicated whether ·th:ey 
intend to ac.cept or reject the benefits which have accru·ed 
to them as a result of these transactions they seek· to :lise 
the holding Inade in the Pace case to bolster their 
position here. This to us presents a classic example of 
attempting to "'eat their cake and keep it at the same 
time." 
~liS~IA:N AGEMENT. 
The appellants in this case have never taken the 
position that mismanagen1ent, as defined by the author-
ities, is not a ground for receivership. The law is that 
a reeeiver may be app·ointed as ancillary to some other 
rem·edy, such as accounting \vhen there has been mis-
management of a certain character. To justify the .ap-
pointment of the re·ceiver, respondents' must show. a 
right to an accounting, plus mismanagement. The very 
quotations which are found in respondents' brief under 
this subdivision show very clearly that they have the 
burden of showing mismanagement. In this Gas·e, they 
have produced no substantial evidence ·of any misman-
agement. 
From a quotation in Tardy's Smith on Rece,ivers, 
1920 Edition, Volum·e 1, Page 723, respondents italicize 
the following: 
''A majority of the stockholders· of· a eorpo-
rati·on, no matter how large, has no right to: divert 
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to then1selves assets of the company to the detri-
ment of its creditors and stockholders.''. 
C~ounsel are merely using words, and abstractly at 
that, when they quote such language. They did not 
introduce any evidence at the trial of the case that any 
a.sset·s \Vere diverted by majority stockholders. They 
could not point out at the trial of this case wherein any 
as-sets had been diverted. They do not point out in their 
briefs on appeal where any assets have been diverted, 
and the simple question, "What assets have been di-
verted~'' has never he en answered ~nr attempted to be 
answered by respondents. 
Again in t:he quotation from High on Receivers, 4th 
Edition, Section 295 B, the italicized portion refers to 
''fraudulently and wrongfully misappropriating the cor-
porate property, and it therefore profited.'' 
Wherein dn such quotations have any n1ateriality 
here, unless counsel thinks that hy a .continual repetition 
of such words they n1ay finally, Goebhel like, make this 
Court believe that those oft-repeated phrases wre true. 
Respondents italicize the following from 16 Fletch-
ers on Corporations, 165: 
'' \-Vhere they are trying to freeze out the 
minority, or \vhere the mismanagement is evi-
denced by or accompanied with conversion, n1is-
a.ppropria tion or division of c-orporate funds by 
such officers.'' 
Here again they attempt to make in1pres.sive use of 
words which have no application t'O the case at bar. By 
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purchasing the ~tot'k "·bich \ra~ purchased predomin'antly 
~n the yt>ars 1934 and 1~1~33, "·herein \vere the present 
plaintiffs frozen out ? The onl~· persons who \Vere frozen 
out. if such tt>rn1 can be so used, \vere the individuals 
\vho sold their stock to stockbrokers and other individ-
uals. TI1ey are not ~on1plaining in this la-\v suit, and are 
not represented h-ere. 
The a11thorities cited by respondents are not helpful, 
and in the main haYe no bearing on the questions pre-
. sented here for the consideration and deter1nination of 
the court. 
In Ponca Jlill Glonz.pany v. ~fikesell, 55 Neb. 98, 
75 N. ,,~. 46, cited at page 100 of respondents' brief, the 
defendants demurred to a eo·mplaint seeking, among 
other things, receivership of a corporation. The de-
murrer was overruled, defendants refused to plead, a 
receiver \Yas appointed, and from the order of the Court 
overuling the de1nurrer and the appointment of a re-
ceiver, the defendant appealed. The appellate Court 
held that the eomplaint \vas sufficient. 
A comparison of the facts alleged in that complaint 
with the facts alleged and proved in this case will show 
they have no similarity. This opinion does not cast any 
doubt whatsoever upon any of the fundamental matters 
presented and argued by appellants. Not one single 
matter relied upon by app·ellants for a reversal -of the 
judgment of the trial Court here was determined or 
considered by the Court in the case cited. 
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The :case of Brent v·. B·. E. Brister Sawmlill Com-
pany, 103 Miss. 876, 60 S'o. 1018, cited at page 101 of 
re.spondent~' brief, was an appeal from an order appoint-
ii):g a receiver. With the pTopositions of law stated 
in that .opinion, we do not disagree. In the discussion of 
the. ~ase. by respondents many statements are italicized. 
:Fo:r what reason we are not aware. These italicized 
stfltements d<;> not. pertain to legal issues concerning 
vvhich the parties hereto are in -conflict. For instance, 
by italics the attention of the Court is directly called to 
th~' pr.6position that where the majority of stockholders 
pursue operations which must eventually be ruinous or 
should the enterprise he abandoned as impossible of 
realization, any shareholder ,v.ould upon plain and equit-
able principles, be entitled to the assistance of a Court 
of :equity. This proposition is not in dispute. But in 
the case ·at bar there are no findings, nor was there any 
proof to make this principle of law applicable. It is 
simp1y.imma.terial. Again it is stated: 
""\Vhen it shall appear that by gross mis-
management of the affairs and 1nisapplicati·on of 
the property or funds of a -corporation by the 
directors or other officers in control, the rights 
Qf the stockholders, as well a.s the creditors, are 
put in jeopardy * * * the c.ourt 111ay appoint 
a re·Ceiverr to take charge of the busineS·S of the 
corporation.'' 
This matter is not disputed and is not material nor 
. ' ' . . ' 
applicable to a· determination of the issues presented, 
for the simple reason that there is no finding nor proof 
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of. misn1anagement as a result whereof the rights of the 
stockholders are being put in jeopardy. 
The facts of that case and the facts of this case have 
no similarity \Yhatsoever. In that case it app·eared, with-
out doubt, that one corporation was being opera.ted at a 
great loss and perhaps inefficiently for the direct benefit 
of another corporation in "~hich several of the principal 
stockholders of the defendant corporation vvere inter-
ested. There is no such situation in the case at bar. 
Here again we have a case quoted fro:m .at lengtp 
which casts no doubt whatsoever upon any ·Of the funda~. 
mental propositions relied upon by appellants for re-
versal of the decision of the trial Court. 
Respondents quote 'the entire opinion of Hechler 
v. Emery, 226 N. Y. S. 599. It is imp·ossible to tell from 
that opinion "~hat the ease is about. It in no plac.e 
appears for what -or whom the receiver is to be ap.-
pointed, nor does it appear upon what grounds the same 
is sought. 
T;his case subsequently can1e before the Court. From 
the opinion found a.t 234 N. Y. S. 46, it appea.rsthat the 
plaintiff sought to have a receiver appointed for the stock 
held and ·Claimed by the defendant Emery. This is not 
the situation which is before the Court, here. · From a 
reading of the two opinions, it clearly appears that the 
decision is not in point, and is not determinative of an~ 
of the issues here pTesented. 
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Kennedy Drug Compa;ny v. Keyes, 60 Washington 
337, 111 Pac. 175,.is -clearly distinguishable from the case 
at bar. In the first place, a distinct issue wa.s made as to 
the ownership of the corporate stock, as well as the 
issue of ·consideration paid therefor. 
The brief of appellants, page 81, clearly indicates 
tha.t never was any such issue raised by the pleadings 
in the ,case at bar. 
Another distinct factor is that there were pleadings, 
pr.oof and findings that the defendants' management 
threatened the corporation with insolvency. No such 
thing exist·s here. It also appeared that the de-
fendant, as manager, had contracted heavy obligations 
by causing the corporation to borrow money at a high 
rate of interest, and this is referred to as irregular 
·Conduct. ,Such conduct is not present in the case at 
bar. It is further found that the entire- transaction in 
the Kennedy Drug Company case was sho,vn to be fraud-
ulent fron1 its ·commencen1ent. That plaintiff "\Vas effectu-
ally defrauded of his property. There is no pleading, 
proof or finding in the case at bar of any such transac-
tion. Many fraudulent representations and much fraud-
ulent conduct on the part of the defendant in that case 
was . shown by the evidenc.e. A readin~ of that case 
wip sho'v that it is not in any way helpful to the re-
spo~ents herein. 
··' Respondents cite the case of Cantw·ell, et ft·l. v. Col. 
Lead ·Co., CMo.) 917 S. ,V. 167. The case is ·not·discussed, 
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but a portion of the opinion of the Court IS set forth 
'vithout c-omn1ent. 
The Cant"'"ell ease "'"as another case where the Court 
considered merely the allegations of the complaint, and 
held that the alleg-ations \vere sufficient to ju·stify the 
Court in appointing· a receiver. The facts have no 
similarity ,,,.hatsoever to the facts in the case at bar. 
X ot one sing-le proposition presented by the appellants 
and relied upon by them for reversal of the judgn1ent 
herein, \Yas discussed, let alone decided, by the Missouri 
Court in the Cantwell case. 
The italicized language in the quotation found at 
pages 110-111 of the brief, is another instance of irrele-
vant statements concerning which there is no dispute. 
There are no findings, there is no· evidence here that 
the United Bond and Finance Corporation has been, 
or is being wrecked for purely, selfish and illegal pur-
poses, n~r that minority interests are frozen out; that 
business immorality ha~s run amu·ck, or that by fraud, 
conspiracy or covinous conduct or extreme mismanage-
ment, the rights of minority stockholders have be~n 
put in imminent peril, and that the underly~ng original 
corporate entity ·cordiale has been unfairly destroyed .. 
These matters when prnved are generally held to 
be sufficient to authorize and justify the Court in appoint-
ing a receiver, but in the case at bar there are no findings 
and no proof of their existence. 
The case of Morse v. Metropolitan 8. S. Co., et al., 
87 N. J. Eq. 219, 100 Atl. 219, is cited but for \Vhat pur-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
56 
pose· i.s. ·Certainly ;not. apparent to .the writers. of this 
hri·ef.: J t is. -h~rd to conceive of cases as entirely differ-
ent as. ,Jhe ;Mors.e case and the case at b.ar. The Morse 
case, involved an action for receiver·ship of a corpo\.. 
ration ·,wh~ch had no property whatsoever in the State 
of New, Jersey; a corporation whose p·roperty had been 
removed from New Jersey to Califiornia, and which had 
not, over a period of years, earried on any business 
whatsoe-ver in the State of New Jersey. There were no 
findings which in any way resembled the findings herein. 
The appeal did not determine or attempt to determine 
any issue which has been presented by the records in 
this case. It does not in any way support any position 
contrary to the position ·Of the app·ellants in this ca.se. 
:In the case of ·Sant .v. Perreville .Shingle Company, 
179 Mich. 42, 146 N. W. 212, it appeared that the major-
ity stockholders had appropriated all of the · property 
of t~at eompany, and that the c,ompany had -ceas·ed to 
operate and was virtually dead. The receivership there 
was for the purpose of winding up the affairs of the 
corporation-a far-cry from the situation in the case at 
. . . I 
bar. It appeared that the largest stockholder had ap-
propriated all of the property of the eorp·oration, and 
it ~as found that he was indebted to the said company 
in the sum of $10,884.26, and that that indebtedness con-
stituted the sole as·s.ets of the company. A recitation of 
these facts. shows how utterly irrelevant and immat·erial 
thl.s.·case is . 
. The :first· paragraph quoted by the respondent is 
language used by the: Court in supporting the claim of 
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the attorney for the c-o1nplainants in the,·Sa.nt case. The 
second paragraph relates to the same subject, and the . 
Court goes on to say that it seems just ·and equitable·· 
that the corporation should pay the reasonable expenses 
of bringing into its treasury funds which would not have·· 
been recovered "ithout the efforts and litigation insti-
tuted by the complainants. Based upon this reasoning· 
the Court allowed the claim ·of the complainants' at-
torney. ''nat has this to do with the case at bar~· 
Col. 1\ ... at. Sand Dredging Company v. liVashed Bar 
Sand Dredging Company, 136 F. 710, cited at page 11~ 
of re.spnndents' brief, is an opinion ·Of the Penn·sylvania 
Federal District Circuit Court, and involved. a suit for 
receivership by minority stockholders. It appeared 
from the complaint and from the facts that ·the manag-
ing officers of the defendant corporation were the office:r;s 
and owners of another corporation, and that the affairs 
of the defendant corporation were managed at a loss to 
it and for the benefit and profit of the other corporation. 
It also appeared that stock in the defendant corporation, 
which had been bought by the managing corporate officers 
had not been paid for,. and that the money.a.dvanced'by: 
these officers for the building of certain machines, which 
mon~ys they agreed to advance in paym-ent for the stock; 
had been charged as a loan against the ·defendant com~. 
pany in favor of the other corporation· o~e~ by th.e~s~. 
officers~ This case has no similarity to the case at·· bar; 
no issue is determined, or· discussed in ·the opinion of 
that ease which has been presented by this appeal. 
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The quotation italicized, set £,orth on page 113 of the 
brief, shows this dissimilarity. The basis of that de-
cision seems to be the finding ''that the baard of dire:e-
tors V\rho are responsible for the mismanagement are 
the majority stockholders, and that they are 1nanaging 
the corporation f.or their OV\'ll benefit· and diverting its 
funds and income to themselves.'' There are no such 
findings here. 
The case of Bankers J.fortgage Cornpany v. Rttpp, 
(·C. C. A. 10) 6·6 F·ed. ('2d) 99·2, cited at page 115 of re-
spondents' brief does not involve, nor did the Circuit 
C·ourt deterinine any single issue presented by the appeal 
in this case. The quoted portions o.f the opinion refer 
to the ''Tell recognized do·ctrine that a c.ourt of chancer~:" 
may intervene and appoint a receiver under certain cir-
cumstanc.es. If it is true that the la.w announced by an 
appellate Court 1nust be considered and ·construed in 
light of the facts and factual issues "\vhich make the prin-
ciples of la"r pertinent, then \Ve say that the opinion 
has no relevancy or pertinency to the facts and issues 
presented on this appeal. That case arose on an 
application to the Circuit Court to stay the re-
ceivership pending final determination of the case 
on its merits. The Court specifically points out 
that the evidence was not before it, and that they, 
·of necessity, must take the findings of facts as con-
·clusive. It appears that the managing directors had 
been purchasing savings bonds of the corporation from 
their holders at a · sn1all part of their ca.sh surrender 
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value, and then delivering them to the corporation at 
their full eash surrender value. It wa.s further found 
that if the n1anag-in·g <,lirector8 were permitted to pa.rti-
cipate in the management of the eompany, they would 
continue such ·conduct. It also appeared tha:t the manag-
ing directors "~ere indebted to the corporation in a su1n 
exceeding· $100,000.00, and that because of the man-
agement the co1npany had had prolonged difficulty 
"'~ith the Blue Sky Departments in the several states 
where the company operated. The statement indicates 
how far fron1 the ease at bar this Rupp case is. Had 
Bec~stead purchased the stoc:k personally from the hold-
ers thereof at a very small or nominal figure, and then 
sold it to the corporation for its par value, we would 
have an an·alagous situation. Such, h·ovvever, is not the 
case here, and hence this opinion can be of no assistance 
in the determination of the matters raised by the appel-
lants on this appeal. 
The case of Bo!othe v. Su:mmitt Gold Mining Com--
pany, 5·5 '':rash. 167, 10:! Pac. 207, cited at page 116 of re-
spondents' brief, \Yas a case vvhere the capital stock vvas 
evenly divided, and where there was a irreconc~ilable con-
flict, .and vvhere those having the control did not own nor 
repre·sent a majority of the stock. The Court followed 
rules re·cognized gener•ally and not in dispute. The de-
cision is based squarely on the propositi~on that every 
corporation is to be controlled by a board representing a 
majority of the voting stock, and that no majority con-
trolled the corporation there. 
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Seven .cases are cited .on pages 117-118 of respond-
ents' brief. 1;hose. eas-es are even further away than 
the cases from which he makes quotations. They merit 
no more consideration by the c·ourt than given by the 
authors o£ :respondents' brief. 
~Commertcirig at page 118 of re·spondents' brief, the 
proposition tba t ''Insolvency Need Not Be Shown'' is 
argued .. ¥any authorities, no doubt, support that state-
ment of law. However, these authorities do not support 
the proposition that insolvency is not an important fac-
tor in the vast majority of .cases where the appointment 
of a. receiver has been sustained on appeal. The faci 
that a corporation is solvent and a going concern cer-
tainly is strong evidence that there has been no mis-
Jnana.gement of its affairs. 
An examination of the eases where ·Courts have 
held that insolvency need not be shown in the great-
majority .of instances, will show that there was a present 
danger of loss or wrongful diversion of corporate assets 
and also 'fraud and dishonesty in the management. 
In the case at bar the plaintiffs charged systematic, 
·habitual and long continued wrongful diversion and 
misappropriation of ·corporate assets, and that as a result 
of these a·ctivities the .eorporration was either insolvent 
or in imminent danger of· insolvency, but their proof 
failed to support either the allegations of wrongful mis-
appr-opriation or insolvency. It appeared on the other 
band· that the corporation is solvent and has a large 
r.es-erve. 
;1 
'I :r 
I 
i~I 
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It 'vas and is, appellants' contention ~that the· failure 
of the plaintiff to prove the "~rongful diversion and sys-
tematic· and· fraudulent misappropriation of .corpor~te 
assets, when considered "~ th the proof of the ·solvency 
of the corporation, required a. finding that there~ ~had 
been no m.i,smanagement and therefore judgment for th.e 
defendant. 
We believe that a -consideration of every case cited 
by the respondents under this subdivision of their: ·brief 
will show either uncontradicted allegations or findings 
of positiYe fraud, willful misappropriation, and diversion 
of corporate assets, "~hich has resulted in a present well-
founded danger of insolvency . 
. SYSTEMATIC AND HABITUAL EVIL PRACTICES 
16 Fletchers on Corporation, page 172, is correctly 
quoted by counsel. It is to the effeet that before a Coti~t 
will appoint a receiver for a goin·g and pr·osperous ·COn-
cern which is neither insolvent or in danger of ins-olvency, 
the evil practices must be systematic and habitual and 
so interwoven as to beeam·e a part of the general bu~i­
ness. Plaintiff must prove this before he is ·entitle4 .to 
a receiver. 
As heretofore indicated, the evidence claimed by 
counsel to sh.ow evil practices ends in· the year 1936-:-
four years previous to the commencement of this ·a;c:tion. 
\V1herein is there any proof that the pra.ctices complained 
of are now systematic or habitual or interwoven tso ras 
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to becon1e a part of the general busrines'S? We have here-
tofore pointed out th'at there is no proof of the existence 
of any evil practices. 
·Eiven if we agree with appellants for the sake of 
arg·ument that the practice of the corporation of buying 
its 0\\7n S'tock was ''an evil pra:ctiee,'' this practice is not 
intervv-oven with the affairs of the corporation, has not 
been followed srince 1936, and has no present connection 
whatsoever \vith the operation of the corporate affairs. 
C·o.mmencing- at page 122, respondents present their 
argument on the question of ac-counting. The most re-
markable thing ahout this argument is that respondents 
seem t·o have abandoned entirely the order of account-
ing as made by the Court. They have made no effort to 
support it, and without doubt this order is the cap stone 
of respondents' case. Evidently respond~nts agree with 
appellants that this order of ac;c,ounting cannot be sup-
ported. If there is to be any accounting here, it must 
be such accounting as O]}dered by the c~ourt, and that 
only. VV .. e have contended, and \Ve think OUr -contention 
is supported by responsible authorities, that the account-
ing as ordered is not justified or warranted by the plead-
ings, proof or findings. Their failure to support the trial 
Court's accounting order, fortifies our position that the 
one and only. purpose of this suit is receivership and 
therefore must fail. F'rom respondents' argument it 
seen1s they now 'Nant an accounting on matters not men-
tioned ~o·r granted in the decree in thi~s case. 
'I 
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,,~ith the la\Y as quoted we have no disagreement. 
Its appli·cation is the thing· \Ve say ·cannot be made to the 
case at bar. 
A few of the stateJnents made by counsel are perha:ps 
worthy of note. 
On pag·e 1~5 is one of the m-ost hum·orous statements, 
of course not meant to be so, \vhich we have ever seen 
in a brief. Resp~ondents say: ''We presume appellants 
will allow plaintiffs a credit for the 1102 head of sheep 
sold by Beckstead for $5,300.00 while the trial was 1n 
progress, which would reduce the number to 998. '' 
In the first place we fail to understand just how or 
in what manner plaintiffs are entitle.d to any credit what-
soever on this matter of sheep. In the ·second place, it ap-
pears clearly from the record that the sheep sold were 
all lambs. Perhaps Counsel is not aware of the fact 
that ewes produce lambs. 
Also on page 135 it is stated that the mortgage in-
debtedness against the Wyoming ranches is in exce~ss of 
$14,000.00. We challenge respondents to support that 
statement by the citation of any evidence whatsoever. 
From respondents argument it might appear that 
there is some evidence that the hooks and records of the 
Beckstead Livestock Company and the United Bond and 
Finance Corporation do not accurately show the condi-
tion of affairs as they exist between these two corpora-
tions. There is no such evidence; there is no such find-
ing, and there has been no showing made in regard . to 
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these ·corporate relationships which demands or neces-
sitates the appointment of a receiv~er. 
·On page 126 is a statement which is not only redicu-
lous, but ·could find support only in the imagination of 
counsel for respondents: 
''We venture that such an accounting will 
s:h.ow an outstanding unpaid indebtednes·s of the 
Beckstead Livestock c·ompany considerably 
nearer the sum of $94,000.00 than the figure of 
$14,000.00 .stated a.t page 61 of appellants' brief.'' 
We suggest that the only indebtedness of the Beck-
stead Livestock Cnmpany which is of any .consequence 
whatsoever to thes·e respondents is the indebtedness of 
the Livestock C;ompany to persons, firms or corporations 
other than the United Bond and Finance Corporation. 
As we understand it, it is impossible for a man to owe 
anything to himself. Likewise, it would be impossible for 
a corporation to owe anything to itself. The Beckstead 
Livestock C.ompany is a part of the property and a p3:rt 
of the holdin~s of the United Bond and Finance Corpora-
tion. Every asset owned by the Beckstead Livestock 
Company is owned by the U:q.ited Bond and Finance Cor-
poTation through its ownership of all of the stock in the 
livestock company. 
W·e might point out to the Court at this time the 
ineonsistency which is present in this phase of respond-
ents' brief. He cites Commerce Tru.st Comp·any v. Wood-
bury, "77 ~ed. 478, to the effect that a corporation is a 
wholly separate entity from its stockholders, and that 
.r 
.. ,r 
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o"·nership of all stock of one corporation hy .another does 
not create a merger of the two corporations into a single 
entity. He then cites '1'rustee System of Penn v. P·a.yne, 
65 Fed. (2d) 103; Cornnz.erce Trust Company v. Wood-
bury, 77 Fed. (2d) -178 and Texas Company V'. Roos, 9·3 
Fed. (2d) 380, to the effect that the entity of interlock-
ing corporations may be disregarded in receivership 
n1atters. 
\Y. e do not believe any of these cases will help in the 
case at bar. Counsel can't escape from the fact that 
the Livestock Company is .owned completely by the 
Finance Corporation. The audits introduced in evi-
dence and the ·exhibits relating to this subject, indicate 
definitely that the records reflect the transaetions he-
tween the two corporations, which a.re merely a matter 
of bookkeeping, and also the property used by the Fin-
ance Corporation in obtaining the assets which it now 
holds in the name of the Livestock C-ompany. 
\\1 e desire to point out that respondents are sup-
posed to be citing ,cases and ~discussing the accounting 
decree ordered by the Court. They have gone afield. 
At page 129 of their brief respondents wonder why 
Bec~stead was apprehensive about the stock of the com-
pany being in the hands of stockbrokers. Beckstead 
undoubtedly knew the diffieulties which the .corporation 
would likely encounter. These stockholders ha.d not 
bought the stock to hold a:S an investment. They had 
purchased the stock for only one reason, to make a profi:t 
upon its sale, and they would and no doubt did exert 
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every effort to force the Finance C·orporation to buy 
this stock from them. 
We believe tha.t Beckstead was entitled t() use his 
good judgm.ent in getting this .stock out of the hands of 
these stockbrokers. It is n1ot a question o.f handling the 
business properly or keeping accura.te books. It is a 
question of getting stock out of the hands of those who 
do not desire to hold it, but who are d·etermined to sell it. 
'On page. 130 of the hrief r.e,s.pondents claim that 
·,t, 
J· 
B·eckstead did some~thing wrongful in buying up bonds ~:: 
of the corporation at sixty cents on the dollar. If, as 
a manager of the corporation, he could buy them up at ~~ 
forty cents on a dollar, it would be his duty to do .so, and 
if he didn't, re:spondents would he here showing that 
he had an opportunity to reduce the indebtedness of the 
corporation for less than its face amount and didn't do 
so, and therefore ha·d mismanaged the affairs of the 
company to the detriment of its stockholder,s. 
We say that as the manager of this corporation it 
was his duty to do as it i~s charged he did. As hereto-
fore remarked, how or in what manner or to what extent 
was this ·coTporation or these respondents injured .by 
the action of the managing officers in retiring the~se 
bonds at sixty cents on the dollar. None of the bond-
holders have ·complained. None of them are before the 
Court. There seems to be no legal nor practical sup-
port for the heroic po·sition now taken by respondents. 
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Respondents have spent n1ore tin1e in arg·uing their 
conclusions than they haYe in presenting the argument 
on some of the most vital issues in this case. We shall 
take notice of a fe\Y of these so-called conclusions. 
It is stated as a eonclusion: For every unit of stock 
purchased by them these stoekholders ha.ve paid Beck-
stead a premium for commissions of either $2'5, $30 or 
$50 over and above the $100.00 par value of the preferred 
stock. This is not a eonclusi~o-n based on the evidence, but 
one taken from the unsupported imagination of respond-
ents. The commissions were paid to the stock ,sales-
man. Beckstead received a. commission on the stock he 
sold and an over-writing c:ommi.ssion on stock ·sold by 
agents working under him. It is true the units sold for 
$125.00, $135.00 and $150.00, but the ·Commission was 
always twenty per cent and never varied. On units. sold 
for $125.00 the commis.sion, including overwriting, was 
$25.00, on units sold for $135.00, the ·commission, includ-
ing overwriting, was $27.00, and on units which .sold 
for $150.00, the commission, including overwriting, was 
$30.00. 
Throughout these conclusions reference is made to 
the fact that Beckstead received the.se commissions. The 
purpose is apparent, but its accuracy is disproved by 
the uncontradicted evidence in this ·case. Arguments in 
the form of conclusions are set forth with respect to 
Be·ckstead's stockholdings. These have never been dis-
puted. The significant thing is that no attempt has 
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been made in this action to cancel them or set them aside, 
and no such order has ever been made. 
An fnteresting statement in the form of a conclusion 
is contained at page 133 : Wha,t will an aecoun ting show 
t1ha.t Beckstead has done \vith the moneys and ass·ets of 
the trust estate~ 
No such ac.counting order "ras ever made, and no 
such question is p~resented by the decree nor the findings 
of fact in this eas·e. There h~as heen no effort to disprove 
appellants' contenti,on that the books of the company 
contain a complete and accurate answer to this question, 
and no reflection has ever been cast upon their accuracy 
or sufficiency. This que,stion shows exactly what respond-
ents desire. They desire a receiver only. They have not 
taken the time nor made any effort to gain for them-
selves the information ~shown on the ~eompany's books, 
but suggest that perhap:S a reeeiver could do it for them 
at less trouble to themselve,s after hi~s appointment. 
The respondents are not interested in the accounting. 
What they want is a receiver, and that only. 
On page 134 is s-et forth respondents' so-called con-
clusion with respect to the pur;chase by the corporation 
of its own stock. Again they overlook the opportunity 
to tell the Court tihejr inten~tions with respe(~t to the 
advantages gained for the corporation and for these 
respondents by these transaetions. We would still like 
to know whether they have ·concluded to '·'.e:a.t their 
cake or keep it.'' 
l! ~ 
:~ 
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Counsel drags in the American Keene Cement and 
Plaster Company and the exchange of stock effe·cted be-
t,Ye-en that company and the Finance Corporation. 
The trial C·ourt found nothing wrong in this trans-
action. It 1nade no finding ''""ith respect to this matter. 
It made no order in relation thereto so far as an acc:ount-
ing is coneerned, and \Yhy has couns.el brought it into 
the ease on appeal. It supports no pleading.s. It sup-
ports no finding. It supports nothing in the decre·e. 
On page 135 are set forth certain purported con-
clusions to the ·effect that Beckstead intended to steal 
and wrongfully appropriate the stock R>equired by the 
corporation beeause it was allowed to a~ccumulate and 
remain uneancelled, but indorsed in blank in the posses-
sion of the corporation for a certain length of time. 
We submit that there are only two eonclu.sions which 
cou~d be made in regard to this practice: 1. That Be-ck-
stead intended to steal the stock; and 2. That he did not 
so intend. The only one of these conclusions which finds 
any support in the evidence whatsoever is the conclusion 
that he intended to hold it honestly and for the benefit of 
the eorporation. Any other .conclusion would do violence 
to the evidence. The fact is that he did not appropriate 
one share of it. As a matter ·of fact this stock was not 
left indorsed in blank, hut immediately upon its acquire-
ment the name of the Finance Corporation wa.s inserted 
in the :as~signmen t as the as,signee. 
In ·eonnection with the argument set forth as a con-
clusion ·at the bottom of page 135 of respondents' brief, 
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it· is sufficient to say that all of these transactions were 
investigated by the Court and no finding was made to 
the effect that there had been or that there was, any 
wrongful diversion or misappropriation of co~rporate 
assets as a result of these transactions, or any of them, 
or that the corporation suffered any loss whatsoever by 
reason of them. 
~It is concluded by way of argument that there is a 
large amount of O'tlheor property which cannot here be 
mentioned, and why can it not be ·mentioned~ Certainly 
it is not for lack of space. Certainly it is not for lack 
of time. It cannot be mentioned because there is no 
evidence to support the .statement of other property 
whi·ch ap1)arently it is claimed, h'as be.en appropriated. 
·:An argument in the form of a conclusion with re-
spe-ct to certain t•ransactions pertaining to the acquire-
ment of the sheep and property in Wyoming are set 
forth. , 
. It appears that respondents eonclude from this part 
' , 
of their argum·ent that B·e·cks~tead intended to ste·al the 
D'ens.ley Beckstead sheep and the profits accruing 
therefrom ; that he intended to :Steal the land, the 
cattle and the other pr1operty now belonging to the 
Beckstead Livestock Company. The only other con-
clusion is that he did not so in tend, and in this instance, 
as the one heretofore mentioned, the only conclusion 
supported by the evidence is the latter. No sheep, no 
cattle, no l'and, n·o other property of the corporation was 
wrongfully taken, .stolen or embezzled. 
) 
·.• 
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It seems to be respondents' position that be·cause 
the opportunity for conyersion, embezzlement and lar-
ceny existed, the intention to do so therefore existed. 
Reasoning on this basis, eYery man, '"'oman and child 
intends to commit any and perhaps every crime known 
to the la,v. 
This reasoning is followed to it.s logical or illogical 
conclusion on page 137. Respondents conclude that be-
cause the opportunity to steal and embezzle existed 
Beckstead was therefore guilty of c.onversion. In ar-
riving at this conclusion, of cour,se, they lose sight -com-
pletely of all of the evidence in .the case. 
We call the Court's attention to one argumentative 
conclusion set forth on p1a.ge 138, as follows : The great 
wonder is that the corporation ha.s survived sueh gross 
mismanagement as it has. 
We a.re wondering just what respondents' definition 
of mismanagement is~ 
Surely the judgment appealed from should be re-
versed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLIINGS, WALLACE & BLACK, 
BRIGHAM E. RoBERTS, 
Attorneys for App·ellavnts. 
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